Skeptical Humanities

Hi again, everybody! ‘Hall Of Shame’ continues!

3 RONALD ENGLEFIELD (and others)

Ronald Englefield (1891-1975) was an English poet and philosopher. His major work,
Language and Thought, remains unpublished, though extracts appeared in the journal Trivium and this material is commented upon (often supportively) by other authors such as G. A. Wells and D. R. Oppenheimer. While Englefield’s specifically linguistic ideas have not met with wide acceptance, his criticism of religion and philosophy, published posthumously, was relatively well received.

Englefield was overtly critical of mainstream thought on language; he objected to the general pretentiousness and loose thinking which he found in much philosophical and linguistic work on the subject, and was especially critical of the effect on thinking of the use of words – in linguistics, literary criticism, religious studies and other philosophical domains – where they allegedly have no clear referent. Like Amorey Gethin (see my earlier comments), he went so far as to regard linguistics as a ‘bogus science’. However, Englefield’s skewed understanding of the writings of linguists (see below for an example) reduces the strength of his own claims.

On the origins of language, Englefield followed eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers such as Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, who argued that language evolved naturally from gestures. Englefield ‘explains’ how an animal little more intelligent than modern apes could ‘progress’ from a natural gesture language to invent a spoken and later a written language.

Some of Englefield’s views on these matters were opposed to those of other writers marginal to the mainstream such as Philip Ballard, who seem to believe (quite wrongly) that the grammar and other structural aspects of one’s first language are learned by explicit instruction (some of these writers, at least, appear to have been distracted by awareness of the teaching of STANDARD grammar to native speakers of non-standard dialects). In contrast, Englefield (though possibly confused in a broadly similar way; see below) argues that even modern humans can communicate WITHOUT the benefit of grammar.

Specifically, Englefield joined Wells and others in critiquing the linguistic ‘paradigms’ associated with Noam Chomsky. While Chomskyan thought does invite skeptical comment (again, see my earlier discussion), some of these critics of Chomsky are confused on some quite basic issues. For example: Englefield suggests (with Wells) that – if Chomsky’s view of the matter is correct – adult native speakers of a language who do not command the grammar of the relevant standard variety have either somehow FAILED to develop (pre-birth) the tendency to acquire grammar which Chomsky believes humans inherit, or HAVE acquired grammar but have then ‘lost’ or suppressed it. Wells and Englefield seem to have misunderstood what Chomsky means when he says that all normal human infants have access to a Universal Grammar (UG) enabling them to acquire the syntax and other aspects of their native languages very rapidly. The term grammar here (as elsewhere in linguistics) does NOT refer only to standard/formal grammar as taught in schools and socially endorsed as ‘good usage’ (etc.); it also includes the grammar of informal and indeed of non-standard usage as used naturally by many native speakers of each language. Native speakers who systematically produce non-standard forms have simply acquired a DIFFERENT grammar. The idea that non-standard or informal usage somehow LACKS grammar, while widespread among non-linguists, is folk-linguistic and does not stand up under careful examination; and Chomskyan linguists fully accept this.

The acquisition of the SPECIFIC grammars of individual languages (spoken or signed) clearly requires exposure to suitable data (as does the acquisition of their respective phonologies); not even a ‘hard-line’ Chomskyan would dispute this. However, some non-linguists (including some skeptics) assume that humans actually inherit some of the specifics of their parents’ or ancestors’ particular languages. Even a few scholars in relevant disciplines have adopted this stance, notably J.R.R. Tolkien, who was expert in philology (descriptive historical linguistics) but not in modern theoretical linguistics. Tolkien apparently believed, for instance, that he himself had acquired older varieties of English formerly used in his own home area (where his family had long resided) more readily than would students from other areas. No positive evidence of such effects exists, and, if they were genuine, they would in fact be difficult to explain in scientific terms. Children clearly inherit a language-learning propensity (specific, as asserted by Chomsky, or more general); but they obviously learn the individual languages, accents etc. used by their early carers and in their communities, and if they have no contact with their biological parents they know nothing of the languages used by them.

On Englefield specifically, see F.R.H. Englefield, Critique of Pure Verbiage: Essays on Abuses of Language in Literary, Religious and Philosophical Writings (G.A. Wells and D.R. Oppenheimer, eds) (La Salle, IL, 1990), and Language: Its Origin and Relation to Thought (Wilton, CT, 1977).

Mark

Hi again, everybody! ‘Hall Of Shame’ continues!

2 LAURA KNIGHT-JADCZYK

Laura Knight-Jadczyk (henceforth K-J) is a widely-read independent scholar with highly radical views on history and the nature of humanity. I encountered her work at a stall run by her supporters at the 2008 Unconvention in London, and approached her with information on her linguistic claims, which do not loom especially large but are important – and display some knowledge of the subject but a (temporarily?) incomplete grasp. For example, she accepts Iman Wilkens’ linguistically naïve equations of Greek and English river-names (in his revisionist book Where Troy Once Stood) as clearly valid, and wonders how linguists can justify ignoring his ‘obviously’ impressive success in correlating the two sets of names.

K-J was unwilling to be corrected here (pending further reading), whereas she was (surprisingly) more amenable to my exposition of mainstream reservations about the much less fringe but seriously (and increasingly) controversial theory that Indo-European and several other language families had a common ancestor (‘Nostratic’) spoken 10-12,000 years ago. This theory would fit in with her view (quite widely shared and not altogether unsupported) that there was a world catastrophe at that time caused by minor-planet impact.

More generally, K-J regards the more extreme revisionist/catastrophist histories proposed by Immanuel Velikovsky, Michael Cremo etc. as much more strongly supported by the evidence than mainstream scholars would allow. She holds, in fact, that all such seriously revisionist views are systematically suppressed by ‘the powers that be’.

By way of another specific (more philosophical) issue, K-J is strongly opposed to Judaic-Christian-Muslim monotheism, regarding it as balefully influential even on recent scientific & historical scholarship, and in fact as ‘psycho-pathological’. Saliently, she holds that it would be psycho-pathological even for a creator god to claim the right to allegiance and obedience. I myself agree that humans could legitimately resist such claims – partly because of the logical argument, best summarised by Bertrand Russell, that objective ethical truths (if any exist) cannot follow from religious truths (ditto). But, despite my own atheistic views, I suggest that a creator god, if (s)he existed, WOULD have a prima facie case here, unlike truly psycho-pathological human tyrants making similar claims.

On the other hand, K-J holds (obviously against skeptics and most scientists) that the evidence for spiritual and ‘paranormal’ entities of other kinds is overwhelming and should persuade even those who themselves have no awareness of divine or parapsychological forces in the world. But she also thinks it likely that some humans have a ‘soul’ which confers veridical awareness of these entities. Others (including skeptics) have no such awareness exactly because they have NO souls. (This idea is similar to the less dramatic claim that humans have a psychic/spiritual ‘sense’ but that some are ‘blind’ in this respect.) Souls probably arose by way of mutation in the process of evolution (her version of same!). But it is not clear how such entities as souls (if they can exist at all) could arise in this way (though see for example Stephen Goldberg’s view, expounded in his book Anatomy Of The Soul, that important aspects of a mind can exist after the demise of the brain from which it is generated). And the fact that even members of the same family may differ in respect of such awareness surely renders K-J’s specific position dubious.

K-J is also searching for a new form or aspect of linguistics which would relate to her ontology by way of being ‘hyper-dimensional’. She declined to attempt to explain this idea to me, seeing me as one of the soul-less and thus being permanently unable to grasp the concepts involved. (For her, humanity is doomed to remain divided on issues of this kind, where empirical evidence does NOT directly apply. The soul-less have an incorrigibly impoverished world-view.) She did suggest that semiotics might be identified with her ‘hyper-dimensional linguistics’, but this notion seems to reflect either confusion or a so-far unarticulated non-standard view of semiotics (it is normally taken to be the study of symbolism, with linguistics as one of its most major sub-fields, and thus to be wider in scope than linguistics but NOT at a ‘different level’).

K-J’s main work is her book The Secret History of the World (Grande Prairie, AB, 2008), her main web-site is http://cassiopaea.org/, and her publishing-house, Red Pill Press, is at http://www.redpillpress.com/, where other books by K-J and her associates can be ordered. The most recent issue of the Red Pill Press newsletter (available on enquiry) advertises a second volume of Secret History, Comets and the Horns of Moses. (K-J also had interesting views regarding the predictions of Zecharia Sitchin and others regarding the anticipated appearance in 2003 of the rogue planet Nibiru; see http://www.cassiopaea.org/cass/sitchin.htm.)

Mark

Hi again, everybody!

At Bob’s suggestion, I’m presenting a new series of blogs on specific ‘fringe’ writers (idiosyncratic individuals rather than members of ‘movements’) on language matters (in his words a ‘Hall Of Shame’, though some of these writers are more worthy of attention than this terminology might suggest!).

1 JOHN TROTTER

One example of a deep-thinking person who developed his own idiosyncratic linguistic theories (and issued attacks on the mainstream of linguistics) is the psychologist and amateur logician John Trotter. Trotter was a psychology lecturer in Australia, and in the 1970s-80s he developed radical views on the logical and structural nature of language, and incorporated these into papers offered for publication and into his teaching. His most central focus was on the philosophical aspects of these matters, and one of his main foci within linguistics involved the development of links between the formalism of Chomskyan grammars on the one hand and the ‘predicate calculus’ of logic on the other. If Trotter’s main ideas are valid, much of the basis of linguistic theory and indeed some important aspects of contemporary thought on logic must be mistaken.

Trotter’s papers were rejected by editors and reviewers whom he regarded as inadequately informed, and he was allegedly discouraged from presenting his views to students. After that time he operated as a private scholar. He & I interacted at some length in the late 1990s, but his dogmatic approach to many of his key points does not encourage scholarly attention. (In addition, some of his claims regarding e.g. possible improvements in automatic translation appear to be contradicted by familiar linguistic facts.)

Some of Trotter’s main points involve direct criticisms of mainstream concepts. For instance, he holds that some key mainstream linguistic concepts such as ‘allophone’ and ‘phoneme’ should NOT be used; new formulations of the matters in question should be adopted. This stance involves his rejection in its mainstream form of the ‘emic/etic’ contrast (as in phonemic versus phonetic), which he instead treats as essentially a type-token relationship; for example, each phoneme is seen as a type and each of its allophones as a token of this type. Trotter’s objection at this point is associated in turn with his opposition on philosophical (ontological) grounds to some types of linguistic expression used to express the relationship between types and tokens (for example, he objects to definite descriptions such as the dodo as used to refer to a type, as in the dodo is now extinct). However, whatever might be the merits of Trotter’s philosophical points, his reasons for rejecting the mainstream formulations of the linguistic concepts in question here (‘allophone’ etc.) appear to involve a) a degree of misreading of mainstream linguistics (an allophone of a phoneme is NOT in fact the same thing as a token of that phoneme; it is itself a type, more specific and at a less abstract linguistic ‘level’, and has its own tokens, namely the individual instances where it occurs) and b) an exaggerated ontologically-based preference for one linguistic formulation of such matters over another (not uncommon in philosophical work based on linguistic facts; see below).

Trotter also rejects (mainly covertly, and in some specific respects) the linguistic non-prescriptivist approach to language adopted by mainstream linguists. He argues that certain kinds of formulaic expression of philosophical interest (for instance the logician’s For all X, X is Y = ‘all Xs are Y’, as in ‘all men are mortal’) are to be deemed ungrammatical even though they are the normal forms used by the relevant native speakers (logicians) in such cases. For all X, X is Y is seen as ungrammatical because there is no determiner such as that or the before the second token of X, which would be required in more everyday styles of English if the sentence were to occur (suitably modified) and to be deemed grammatical. For instance, in any other context one would not say For all lions, lion has paws, or even For every/any lion, lion has paws; the noun lion in the second clause would always have a determiner, as in that lion or the lion. However, this does not imply that it must have a determiner in the style used in the technical philosophical/logical domain in which such sentences normally occur. These sentences are NOT ungrammatical in context in any normal sense of this term (prescriptivist or descriptivist).

Trotter goes on to argue that because these expressions are ungrammatical they are also logically invalid – and that, because the issue at hand is central in discussions of logic, the whole basis of logic is thereby impugned. Indeed, the philosophical under-pinnings of contemporary logic and linguistics are grossly inadequate. Both mainstream linguists and philosophers would deny this. First of all, the linguistic features in question are found in only some languages. Not all languages even require determiners modifying nouns; for instance, Chinese and Russian do not. In fact, there are serious problems (albeit not always adequately acknowledged by philosophers) associated with heavy reliance upon linguistic data in a philosophical context, because the details of the constructions involved vary so much from language to language. And, even if it were accepted that ENGLISH sentences such as those cited were ungrammatical, it would thus be difficult to argue that some formulations were logically invalid on the ground that there was an issue with the grammar of the versions of these formulations as expressed in English but not in all languages. English and similar languages have no special status in this respect.

Indeed, the grammatical and logical statuses of expressions in any given language are very largely independent of each other. Grammatical issues can normally bring the logical status of expressions into question only if they involve the meanings of these expressions, for example by rendering them ambiguous or self-contradictory. Most grammatical anomalies (whatever their origin or the status ascribed to them) generate no significant ambiguity and certainly have no logical consequences. A form such as Jo go home (grammatically non-standard) is normally semantically transparent, and its ‘ungrammaticality’ (in contrast with Jo goes home, etc.) has no logical consequences.

For reading, see John Trotter, System of Rational Discourse: Vols. 1 (A Calculus of Attributes), 2 (Aggregates, ‘Numbers’ and ‘Sets’), 3 (Applied Arithmetic and Probability), 4 (A Calculus of Predictions and Propositions), (Aranda (ACT), 1995-6, and other works; see
bibliography with links to online versions at http://isbndb. com/d/person/trotter_john. html (accessed 2 February 2011).

Mark

Hi again, everybody! I’m concluding my section on alleged animal languages with some shorter sub-sections on specific topic areas.

BIRDS

The psychologist and zoologist Irene Pepperberg, who has collaborated with linguists, holds that the vocal behaviour of African grey parrots displays some of the characteristics of human language, and that they are capable of being taught to communicate using aspects of human language. One particular parrot (‘Alex’) reportedly acquired a 150-word vocabulary and used it in a sophisticated way, performing in a way similar to that of a two-year old child; he was also able to differentiate meaning and grasp features of syntax (and to count up to seven). Alex was learning the Roman alphabet and could indicate the names of fifty types of object when he died. Other parrots have demonstrated similar abilities. Pepperberg’s ideas have been reviewed in fairly positive terms. Against critics’ claims that Alex had been taught a ‘script’, she argues that the controls and tests which she used made it impossible for him simply to recite words when she asked questions.

Theodore Barber discusses bird communication mainly in terms of non-linguistic and paralinguistic systems, but endorses Pepperberg’s claims and argues that the general intelligence of birds is equal or even superior to that of humans (he likens it to that of cetaceans; see earlier). Robert Carroll recounts another case of an African grey parrot (‘N’kisi’) which can allegedly engage in conversation.

TEACHING HUMAN LANGUAGE TO NON-PRIMATES

Several studies have tested the ability of dogs to learn at least the vocabulary of human languages, especially nouns referring to specific, concrete items. Considerable success is claimed, but of course the more specifically ‘human’ aspects of language are not involved here. Another, linguistically more original proposal involves the Bliss Symbols. Of course, sheepdogs can be trained to respond to many distinct whistles, and indeed Robert Schusterman reportedly taught a sea-lion (related to the dogs) over 190 distinct gestures. (See also earlier on Fitch’s work on seals.) However, like the more modest passive repertoires of domestic pets, these abilities do not appear to be linguistic in a strict sense (see again earlier).

There is also, of course, a large corpus of wholly sober mainstream work on communication with such animals.

MORE EXTREME CLAIMS

There have been various papers in anomalist journals on the alleged apparently untutored use of human languages by cats, cows, goats, elephants, tortoises and fish; and on reports of humans using sponges for the recording and re-playing of human speech.

Others who have suggested that animals obtain information and communicate by ‘telepathic’ or other mystical means include figures as varied as Rupert Sheldrake, Ted Andrews, Henry Blake, Amelia Kinkade, Trisha McCagh, Arthur Myers, Ashleea Nielsen, Jim Nollman (on alleged wide-ranging inter-species communication though music), Joan Ranquet, E. Scott Rogo, Penelope Smith, etc. It has been suggested that dolphins in particular are strongly telepathic and can understand unspoken thoughts. Eris Andys presents an account of work with dolphins and whales inspired by that of Lilly (see earlier) but involving alleged psychic communication with these cetaceans and combining ideas adopted from Lilly with those of Peter Tompkins and Christopher Bird and of Stephan Schwartz and his ‘Mobius Group’; both of these groups of thinkers are advocates of the reality of psychic powers. Because of the nature of these claims, linguistic details are not normally discussed in the relevant texts; most of these claims are thus of only peripheral interest in this present context. However, Karen Stollznow offers a very useful skeptical review of claims regarding psychic pets.

There have been many sensationalistic reports on ‘the secret life of plants’ (see especially Tompkins as just mentioned), but understandably these seldom involve linguistic matters (though it is claimed by Tompkins that plants can be trained to count). There are also claims involving communication involving even stone and water.

Some reports of non-humans using language involve apparitions of entities interpreted as the spirits of deceased animals. One of the most striking cases involved the ghostly Manx mongoose known as ‘Gef’.

CRYPTIDS

According to some writers who accept their existence, some human-like mysterious animals (cryptids), notably the Himalayan yeti, the North American sasquatch, the Asian almas, etc. (which some writers equate to or liken with supposedly extinct human-like primates such as the pre-historic Gigantopithecus, or indeed Homo neanderthalensis), manifest linguistic or near-linguistic behaviour. If yeti, sasquatches and such exist, they would appear to be very closely related to humans, which renders the matter especially interesting.

Some reports attribute telepathic and associated linguistic powers to sasquatches. However, there are in addition more sober reports of what could be pre-linguistic behaviour involving these cryptids. Myra Shackley also summarizes reports of apparently pre-linguistic behaviour and/or attempts at communication with humans in rudimentary human language among the alleged humanoid almas of the Caucasus and Mongolia (but not among Himalayan yeti or the Chinese yeren). In Belizean folklore, the duende (unlike the other local humanoid cryptid, the sisimite) is explicitly described as able to speak. Until recently, there has not been sufficient data on any such cases which might be suitable for analysis; but I am now working on one such case.

Marius Boirayon reports (quasi-)linguistic behaviour among the supposed giant yeti-like creatures of Guadalcanal, Santa Isabella, Malaita and other islands in the Solomon Islands group; however, no concrete evidence is produced. Boirayon also expresses naïve
ideas about relationships between these creatures’ linguistic performances and the Fijian language (and has apparently naïve notions about language generally).

As ever, detailed references on request.

Are there any other general topic areas of skeptical linguistics which might be of especial interest? Let me know!

Mark

Hi again, everybody! Yet more on alleged animal languages: this time, non-primate mammals.

Some accounts of the use of ‘language’ or of ‘speaking’/‘talking’ on the part of non-primates, especially domestic pets such as cats and dogs, involve loose use of these terms, as discussed above. However, there are many reports, some more clearly non-mainstream than others, of animals other than primates displaying behaviour of a genuinely linguistic nature.

Of course, it is commonfor pet-lovers to over-interpret the quasi-linguistic performances of intelligent mammals such as cats. For example, my fiancée and I have a cat which often appears to call ‘Mam!’ [the Cumbrian word for Mum/Mom] ONLY when we are out of sight. Pre-theoretically, it would be easy to regard such enunciations as linguistic in nature. And indeed many writers have seriously advanced claims (mostly poorly supported) about the supposed quasi-linguistic abilities of domestic cats and dogs. See also later on the alleged teaching of human communication systems to dogs.

Much has been claimed about the communicative abilities of horses (communicating with each other or with humans) – and indeed about the therapeutic value of interaction with horses, especially for children who suffer from autism and similar conditions or have undergone trauma. It is suggested that, like autistic humans (by preference) and non-human primates (see earlier), horses think and communicate pictorially rather than linguistically.

Some of the ideas involved here relate to shamanism and other aspects of ‘New Age’ thinking, and the associated claims regarding horses are of varying degrees of plausibility.

Con Slobodchikoff’s study of prairie dog communication found both dialectal diversity (across three American states) and a sophisticated system of partly musical calls which differentiate even between human beings of different heights and in differently coloured clothing. Slobodchikoff proposes that prairie dogs can refer to other entities (including entities not present at the time of a call), abstract and generalize, and display innovatory usage; he even suggests that they may employ double articulation and syntax. This position appears seriously exaggerated.

Tecumseh Fitch discusses seals, which are able to imitate human speech sounds to a surprising degree. Fitch clearly knows linguistics to a high level, and it appears that his conceptualization and theorizing are sound; but even some of the more scholarly summaries of this work arguably do not adequately distinguish between phonation (the production of speech sounds) and spoken language (see above). Fitch does not claim that seal communication manifests all the key features of human language; for instance, he does not hold that it displays recursiveness, double articulation, syntax etc., and indeed he argues that such features are confined to human language.

There have been various claims regarding the linguistic and artistic behaviour of elephants, which (like some primates) can be induced to paint abstract pictures and may also have surprising mathematical abilities. One study regarding the linguistic or near-linguistic abilities of elephants was made in the context of a rather naïve acceptance of linguistic behaviour on the part of primates (see above) and cetaceans (see below); but given the apparent general intelligence of elephants such studies are not without interest in themselves. On the other hand, the claims for success in this case were modest. Some success was claimed in respect of signing and the use of Zener cards; but it is not in fact clear from the evidence presented that even these positive findings were genuinely valid.

Charlotte Uhlenbroek and other scientists acknowledge that elephants communicate among themselves using low-frequency sounds inaudible to unaided human ears; Katie Payne argues that these calls can be exchanged over great distances and often express personal relationships. Payne’s ideas are to a large extent grounded in personal emotions and in the acceptance of traditional African ideas regarding ‘telepathic’ communion between humans, elephants and other animals; as they stand, they appear too impressionistic and imprecise to permit rigorous testing.

There have been many claims, some fairly persuasive, regarding the linguistic and artistic behaviour of cetaceans, notably baleen whales and dolphins. These mammals’ main modes of communication are said to involve sounds at various frequencies, some of them inaudible to unaided human ears. It has also been argued that they can be successfully taught significant aspects of human language.

John Stuart Reid heads a multi-disciplinary team investigating dolphin communication (whistles and clicks) using a ‘CymaScope’. Dramatic results (allegedly proving that dolphins ‘have language’) are anticipated. An earlier Japanese study reported some success in inducing a beluga whale to develop its own vocabulary of high-pitched sounds to refer to specific, concrete items.

John Lilly (a supporter of the view that apes have been successfully taught significant aspects of human language) reports that bottle-nose dolphins in particular communicate among themselves by ‘painting sound pictures’ (compare the case of horses; autism in humans is again invoked here) and can be trained to communicate systematically using versions of human languages. Towards the end of his career, Lilly came to believe that some trained dolphins were actually communicating with him in English.

In addition to Lilly’s earlier, more sober account of the general intelligence and communicative potential of the small cetaceans, there is a body of early work in this area by Javis Bastian. There are various later writers who cite Lilly and develop his ideas or their own theories regarding dolphin communication. B.F. Sergeev focuses more especially upon the use of sonar by cetaceans in obtaining information, and also surveys material involving other non-human species. He is critical of Lilly’s excesses, and is among the few such authors who discuss the methodological issues involved in seeking to demonstrate the reality of complex and flexible communication systems among cetaceans and to determine their specific nature.

Theodore Barber (see later on birds) endorses rather stronger interpretations of the data in respect of the linguistic behaviour and capabilities of both larger and smaller cetaceans.

Ashleea Nielsen presents ‘New Age’ accounts of dolphin and whale mentality and communication in ‘telepathic’ terms. Heathcote Williams offers a highly personal and overtly partisan (anti-whaling) multi-disciplinary celebration of the great whales and their allegedly profound and spiritual intelligence and communicative abilities. Opposition to the whaling industry and an arguably sentimental identification with its victims are in fact salient features in the contemporary focus upon the supposed intelligence of these mammals. Wade Doak presents a somewhat more restrained but also very personal and committed account of the author’s interaction and communication with dolphins, including elements of ‘telepathy’ and such. Many other writers take similar sensationalist views of dolphins and other cetaceans.

As ever, detailed references on request. More next time!

Mark

Hi again, everybody! More on alleged animal languages, starting with non-human primates.

Opinions vary greatly among linguists and other researchers as to the degree to which human-like primates (chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, orang-utans, other apes, monkeys), sharing as they do large percentages of the human genome, display the capacity for language or indeed display genuinely linguistic thought and behaviour involving systems of complexity and flexibility similar to those of human languages – featuring, for instance, double articulation and syntax.

Some rather impressive cases, adduced by supporters of the view that genuinely linguistic features do occur among non-human primates, involve monkeys. Wild putty-nosed monkeys apparently combine tokens of their three basic calls to generate novel messages, as it were syntactically, or vary their individual calls by adding what appear to be morphological suffixes, in some cases apparently distinguishing between predators which they have observed directly and those which they know others have observed. These features appear quasi-linguistic, near-linguistic or associated with roughly equivalent features in human language, although none of them seems to be strictly syntactic in nature.

Even where spontaneous linguistic thought and behaviour is not claimed, it is often claimed that primates do possess the capability of being taught key aspects of human language, again involving, for instance, double articulation and syntax – even if they have not developed these characteristics themselves, and even if they are incapable of phonation and require to be trained in other modes of expression (notably signed languages such as are used especially by deaf humans). For instance, some chimpanzees which have been raised largely among humans have reportedly become capable of acquiring and manipulating large vocabularies (150 words or more) and other significant aspects of human language, and on this basis it is argued that they demonstrate genuinely linguistic thought and behaviour. On this basis, a New York Times reporter competent in sign language, Boyce Rensberger, was able to conduct what he regarded as the first newspaper interview with a member of another species when in 1974 he ‘conversed’ with Lucy, a chimpanzee who had been instructed in signing (see below).

Scholars critical of such claims argue that even the ‘higher’ primates are unable to link symbolic sounds together in sentences or produce other key features characteristic of language, either after or without attempts at instruction, and that attempts to teach animals human language are doomed to failure. Scholars with such views include Noam Chomsky and his followers such as Stephen Budiansky and Steven Pinker, who adopt such positions largely on theoretical grounds (involving the alleged ‘hard-wiring’ of the language faculty in humans specifically) but who also present empirical evidence supposedly upholding their views. Some active empiricist researchers also reject or at least challenge claims regarding primate language use or language acquisition. Yet other researchers adopt intermediate views on the issue, regarding the empirical evidence as mixed or equivocal, or hold that some primate communication systems should be considered not strictly linguistic but pre-linguistic in character. The debate continues.

R.M. Seyfarth and D.L. Cheney (with Klaus Zuberbühler, whose own wording is linguistically naïve) suggest that non-human primates have not developed their pre-linguistic behaviour further predominantly because, unlike Homo sapiens, they lack a ‘theory of mind’: the recognition that others have thoughts. At some point in human evolution, on the other hand, humans developed the desire to share thoughts, and natural selection led to the development of language as a means of achieving this. This suggests that non-human primates might be regarded as quasi-autistic; the notion is that both non-human primates and (by preference) autistic humans (and maybe also horses, cetaceans and birds; see below) think and communicate pictorially rather than linguistically. Ideas similar to those proposed by Seyfarth are proclaimed by Temple Grandin (who has close personal experience of autism as well as relevant professional expertise), and there seems to be much to commend them, although the specifics are open to debate.

Another group of authors, of a clearly non-mainstream kind, who uphold the view that language is specific to the human species are Christian fundamentalist writers such as the psycholinguist Clifford Wilson. Wilson supports a Chomskyan species-specific model of language as part of an anti-evolutionist program. He analyses the communication systems of various species in terms of distinct ‘types’ of animal, as is usual among creationist thinkers, with the different types each possessing their own, unrelated and in fact specially created systems.

One increasingly important aspect of this debate involves genetics. Since mid-2002 evidence has accumulated regarding the appearance of the supposedly crucial FOXP2 chromosome-code at the relatively recent date of 200,000 BP – around the time when Homo sapiens may actually have begun to speak or at least sign; some of the physiology needed for speech seems to have appeared later. On this ground, many scholars have argued that it is unlikely that non-human primates have the capacity for genuine linguistic behaviour (or indeed that pre-sapiens hominids had such capacities). Even the closely related chimpanzees display possibly crucially different forms of the relevant gene.

It must be noted, however, that not all linguists agree as to the significance of FOXP2 in respect of the human language faculty. Very different interpretations of some of the key findings have been advanced by non-nativist linguists such as Geoffrey Sampson. In addition, it is conceivable that non-human species might possess very different systems of similar complexity and flexibility which are based otherwise than in any given genetic feature such as FOXP2. Indeed, members of Homo erectus (to all appearances) must have built boats to reach insular Flores around 840,000 years BP and it is suggested by some that they must have been able to speak or sign in order to organize such a complex enterprise.

Manipulation of the relevant genes is reported to have altered the mental and behavioural capabilities of mammals such as mice; and a more ‘positive’ interpretation of the situation with respect to non-human primates could involve the suggestion that chimpanzees and bonobos could now be readily induced to develop language, or at least to learn human languages more effectively, by manipulation of the relevant gene.

I will say a little later on the alleged (near-)linguistic capabilities of supposed human-like cryptids (sasquatch, etc.).

As ever, detailed references on request. More next time!

Mark

Hi! See link below! If anyone is interested, copies are available through me at the author’s 50% discount, for EU 22.40, plus postage (to be determined when I have a copy in hand). Please let me know if you’d like one, suggest means of payment (Paypal is possible) and provide your preferred postal address. Cheers! Mark Newbrook

http://linguistlist.org/pubs/books/get-book.cfm?BookID=64212

Hi again, everybody!

This is the first instalment of the last ‘non-historical’ section requested by readers, dealing with the alleged ‘languages’ of non-human animals (and in passing with their ‘pre-linguistic’/quasi-linguistic behaviour, which is sometimes regarded, contrary to most scholarly opinion, as of similar complexity to human language; see below); and with the alleged ability of some animals to learn human languages (especially the key feature of syntax) under training by humans.

As usual, I deal chiefly with non-mainstream material presented by those without linguistic expertise. I refer only in passing to the much larger volume of mainstream (or near-mainstream) work carried out in recent years by linguists (in conjunction with primatologists, etc.) on features of human language as allegedly used by or taught to non-human animals – even where this work is controversial.

The mainstream consensus is that only Homo sapiens of all known animals CERTAINLY uses language or any system of comparable complexity and flexibility. Claims in the popular press and in popular books regarding animal communication are thus rendered more dramatic in prima facie appearance by the use in titles etc. of the term language. However, in many such cases the term language is in fact clearly being used in a looser sense; the idea is merely that more has been learned about the NON-linguistic communication system of some species. On the other hand, where the reference to language in such a report DOES involve the strict sense of the term, the claims are very serious and dramatic indeed and require close examination.

The two most salient distinguishing features of human language are ‘double articulation’ (phonemes/morphemes) and secondly grammar and especially syntax. Together these features enable each human language to express a potentially infinite number of sentence-length meanings with finite inventories of phonemes on the one hand and of words and morphemes on the other. There are, of course, other important features than these which also seem to distinguish human language from other communication systems. For instance, philosophical and psychological questions may be raised regarding the ability of animals to refer to other specific entities (especially entities not present at the time of an utterance), to abstract and generalize, and to display innovatory usage. However, the leading strictly linguistic issue involving the contrast between human language and animal communication involves the fact that no animal communication system displaying the two main features of double articulation and syntax has been discovered so far, however intelligent the animal species in question might be in other respects. Non-human communication systems, no matter how sophisticated they may be in other ways, all appear to lack both of these key features. Some species of monkey have as many as thirty distinct calls; but it is generally held that these cannot be further divided in analysis either into phonemes (as if they were doubly-articulated words or morphemes) or into words or morphemes (as if they were syntactic structures). Each call appears to have a unitary sense such as ‘predator!’, ‘food source’ or ‘go away!’. (See later, however, for contrary claims regarding such species.) Bees can modify their messages so as to express numerical factors such as the distance to a food source, but they do not appear to have the ability to modify a message in DISCRETE ways as occurs in human language (for example, in switching between verb tenses or singular/plural nouns).

It is possible that some animals have communication systems which ARE (approximately) as complex and flexible as human language (or even MORE complex and/or MORE flexible), but have radically different natures. In such cases, it is conceivable that the issues of double articulation and syntax might not arise. Even if they did, the actual physical systems and modes involved might be very different indeed from human physical systems. Some such systems, or their most relevant and impressive features, may have escaped notice to date because of differences in physical mode of communication, etc. For instance, dolphins and whales inevitably avail themselves of different modes of communication because of their aquatic environment (see below). (Compare my earlier comments on possible extraterrestrial languages.)

It is important to note that points specifically concerning the nature of the SOUNDS made by non-human animals do not have any direct implications for linguistic structures at other ‘levels’ such as grammar. It is quite probable that when human language itself first developed it was signed rather than spoken; but this might have affected its grammatical structure only marginally. The capacity for phonation is a necessary but by no means a sufficient condition for spoken language, and it is not a prerequisite for language per se. A creature which cannot produce human speech-sounds at all readily or accurately (such as some non-human primates) may still have language or the capacity for language, which would have to be expressed through modes other than speech. In turn, a creature such as a parrot or a mynah which CAN (perhaps by way of mimicking) produce human-like speech sounds may prove NOT to have language or indeed any capacity for language. This consideration is often ignored or underplayed by non-linguists working or writing in this area; but it obviously affects the significance of findings on animal vocal tracts, etc.

I have focused here upon the question of how far non-human animals might spontaneously possess communication systems displaying complexity and flexibility similar to those of human language. The question of how far some animals can be TAUGHT human language systems displaying the relevant features (double articulation, syntax, etc.), to the point where they display passive or even active command of language, is a separate issue; see later.

Some scientists deal on a broad front with the alleged senses, thoughts , ‘feelings’ and non-linguistic communication systems of a wide range of species from mammals to invertebrates and even microbes. Some of these discuss animal communication systems without seriously attending to the above issues or to linguistics generally; others include some serious discussion of the linguistics involved. The maverick linguist Morris Swadesh presents a fascinating and well-informed (if often rather speculative) account of possible scenarios for the evolution of human language out of earlier communication systems.

As ever, detailed references on request. More next time!

Mark

Hi again, everybody!

I comment briefly here about some claims regarding ‘clicks’, the consonants technically described as ‘velaric ingressives’ (produced with airstreams drawn INTO the mouth and by movement of the velum aka the soft palate rather than by the lungs). These consonants are especially associated with the Khoisan or ‘Bushman’ languages of Namibia and neighbouring areas of southern Africa, as famously portrayed in the movie The Gods Must Be Crazy. Some of them resemble the sound stereotypically used to ‘gee up’ horses.

The mainstream palaeoanthropologist (etc.) Alice Roberts comments upon the long early period when pre-literate humans probably already had language (for the details of which little concrete evidence survives, naturally); she includes an interesting discussion of ‘click’ consonants in a range of African languages, comparing their distribution with genetic data and suggesting (with others, and not unpersuasively) that the development of these phones may well have pre-dated sapiens expansion from Africa.

There are also some more specific, less mainstream (and less persuasively argued) book-length works along broadly similar lines, such as that of Roman Stopa on alleged links between Indo-European and Khoisan.

Dan Willmore and Nicholas Wade are advocates of the view that some aspects of the phonology of Proto-World can be reconstructed; both Willmore (apparently familiar with the relevant aspects of human genetics and with palaeo-anthropology) and Wade argue that Proto-World featured ‘clicks’. At present the only non-Khoisan languages which extensively feature clicks are the languages of the Hadzabe and Sandawe of Tanzania. The two groups of languages are not otherwise similar, and their speakers are hardly close relatives: mitochondrial DNA evidence suggests that the two peoples have been separate from each other for more than 50,000 years. Willmore holds that modern humans began to leave Africa around 50,000 years BP, which itself would imply that any ancestral features which Khoisan and Hadzabe/Sandawe now have in common must have been shared at that date (compare Roberts as cited above). Australian evidence suggests that the beginning of homo sapiens movement out of Africa must be dated earlier than this, perhaps around 70,000 years BP; but the data are still striking. (In addition, Willmore holds that the overall evidence shows that there was just one Proto-World and that it can be reconstructed in part. He is also ‘certain’ that Neanderthals could speak; and he seems to believe (very oddly) that ‘imagination’ is somehow involved even in PHONOLOGICAL change.)

A manifestly non-mainstream article by T. Kluge argues that the human capacity for speech results from features of the brain, notably the ‘language centre’, which have become strengthened through the use of the arms, which in turn arose from the overall arrangement of human limbs (two arms, no wings). Kluge also associates many phonetic features with physiological characteristics; he claims, for instance, that clicks are associated with certain ‘racially’ determined mouth structures. (He further holds that variations in auditory perceptions of phonetic pitch in speech correlate with air-density and thus with the altitude at which a language is used; this is an extreme version of the commonly-expressed folk-linguistic view that differences in prevailing atmospheric conditions generate accent differences, for instance the ‘adenoidal’ quality of the speech of once fog-bound Liverpool).

As ever, detailed references on request. Another new topic area next time!

Mark

Hi again, everybody!

I now turn, in concluding this section, to Backward Masking and related phenomena.

Backward masking, ‘backmasking’ or ‘backtracking’ is a phenomenon in which hidden messages are inserted into or created in music lyrics. These can be heard consciously only when the track is played in reverse, but like RS they can allegedly be heard unconsciously or subconsciously when one listens to the track in normal forward mode, and can thus affect the listener’s thinking (after the manner of ‘subliminal’ messages). Backward messages of this kind may be inserted deliberately by the lyricist, or may (supposedly) occur without any intent of the writer, indicating deep unconscious ideas on her part. (The deliberate introduction of accurate reversals is difficult in the absence of linguistic expertise but may be feasible to a degree.)

Reversals have been reported in the lyrics of AC-DC, the Beatles, Black Sabbath/Ozzy Osbourne, the Eagles, Electric Light Orchestra, Michael Jackson, KISS, Led Zeppelin, Madonna, Motley Crue, Pink Floyd, Prince, Queen, Styx, Frank Zappa, the Los Angeles metal bands the Plasmatics and W.A.S.P, and many other groups and individual performers. In many cases the force of the hidden messages is sinister, involving references to death, suicide, Satan, etc. Some cases of this kind have led to alarm on the part of Christian organizations, and indeed to legal proceedings, notably in connection with a suicide allegedly stimulated by backward masking in the lyrics of a song by the band Judas Priest.

Interestingly, listeners (including skeptics) generally find that they cannot hear the reversals in such cases until they are prompted with the alleged wording, but that after this has happened they cannot avoid hearing them.

Chris French and I are currently planning work on one such case involving the Led Zeppelin song ‘Stairway To Heaven’, which allegedly contains a reversal (very much audible after prompting) interpreted as conveying Satanic messages.

Another phenomenon which arises in music lyrics and in other contexts involving repetition – notably ‘mantras’ as chanted by followers of some religions, etc. – is the distortion of words which are repeatedly heard.

As ever, detailed references on request. New topic area next time!

Mark